Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 51

Issue 1

Article 22

2019

Time's Up, Councilman: Why Military Commissions Warrant
Exemption from Abstention Doctrine
Alex W.S. Lilly

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alex W.S. Lilly, Time's Up, Councilman: Why Military Commissions Warrant Exemption from Abstention
Doctrine, 51 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 359 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol51/iss1/22

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)

Time’s Up, Councilman: Why
Military Commissions Warrant
Exemption from Abstention
Doctrine
Alex W. S. Lilly *
In 2017, two Guantánamo Bay detainees filed writs of
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. Through
different claims, both men argued that the military commissions
convened to prosecute them lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
do so. The first man, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul,
challenged his conspiracy conviction on the basis that it is
unconstitutional to try purely domestic offenses in a non-Article
III tribunal. The second, Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri, has not yet
been tried. As such, he raised pretrial objections to his military
commission’s competence to try him for crimes committed pre9/11. In October 2017, the Supreme Court denied both petitions
for certiorari.
The Court’s denial of both petitions had a devastating
impact on each defendant individually. For Bahlul, it upheld
both a life sentence and the lower D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals’ questionable determination that military commissions
may try purely domestic offenses—like conspiracy—without
violating Article III. In Nashiri, the D.C. Circuit determined
that Councilman abstention—the doctrine that generally
prevents federal habeas review of military proceedings until
post-conviction appeal—applies to Nashiri’s case. By declining
to grant his writ, the Court foreclosed Nashiri’s opportunity to
raise a basic jurisdictional challenge until after his eventual
conviction years down the road.
Refusing to hear these cases also contributed to a larger
public policy problem looming over the military commissions.
Both natural justice and rational terrorism policy require
judicial processes that can efficiently and definitively prosecute
those who commit horrendous crimes.
Still, despite an
American justice system that purports to be a beacon of the rule
of law in the world, our courts display continued and outright
aversion to resolving important questions posed by foreign
defendants. In their current form, the military commissions
*

J.D. candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, May
2019.
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system and corresponding appeals process provide minimal due
process while leaving basic constitutional and statutory questions
unanswered. This sad state of affairs contributes to animosity
toward the “war on terror” abroad, forces victims to wait years
for uncertain outcomes, and undermines the basic assumption
that American justice is grounded in the rule of law.
Bahlul and Nashiri, together, are illustrative of this
problem. The Nashiri court’s broadening of Councilman
abstention now bars every Guantánamo detainee from raising
collateral jurisdictional challenges to the military commissions.
Such foreseeable challenges include—but are not limited to—the
same paramount constitutional question previously raised in
Bahlul.
In short, the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear both cases
allows Article III courts to duck the responsibility to reach the
merits on these questions anytime soon. I propose that Congress
amend the 2009 Military Commissions Act to create an
exception to Councilman abstention for military commissions—
forcing federal courts to confront these cases on their merits,
and providing the certainty and finality of process that terrorist
prosecutions so badly need.
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Introduction
On October 12, 2000, the U.S.S. Cole, a U.S. navy destroyer, was
on its way to join a fleet of warships tasked with enforcing American
trade sanctions against Iraq. 1 It stopped to refuel in Aden, Yemen,
and was scheduled to remain at port for a short four hours before reembarking on its mission. 2 At 12:15PM local time, however, an
explosion erupted, tearing through the ship’s port side and into the
engine room, the mess, and the living quarters. 3 Seventeen U.S. sailors
were killed and 38 more were injured. 4 The culprit was a small,
motorized rubber dinghy manned by two suicide bombers and alleged
1.

This Day in History: October 12, HISTORY (last updated Aug. 21, 2018),
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/uss-cole-attacked-byterrorists [http://perma.cc/FT5K-ZZ82].

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.
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al Qaeda affiliates. 5 The attack’s success brought its mastermind—
Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri—immediate status within al Qaeda and led
to Nashiri’s subsequent appointment as chief of the terrorist network’s
operations for the Arabian Peninsula. 6
After the attack, a man named Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al
Bahlul created what became a popular propaganda video celebrating
the bombing of the Cole and encouraging jihad targeting the United
States. 7 Impressed with the video and its popularity, then-Saudi exile
Osama bin Laden 8 appointed Bahlul as one of his top aides and public
relations secretary. 9 Bahlul quickly became the indispensable
brainchild of al Qaeda’s propaganda and recruitment machine, leading
one United States federal appeals court judge to liken him to Joseph
Goebbels 10—Hitler’s infamous propaganda minister in 1930s Nazi
Germany. He wrote public statements for bin Laden, maintained al
Qaeda databases, and arranged two of the 9/11 hijacker’s loyalty
oaths and “martyr wills.” 11 Bahlul even attempted to participate in
the commission of the 9/11 attacks himself, but bin Laden refused. As

5.

Id.

6.

Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland, NAT’L COMM’N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S. (last visited Jan. 2, 2018),
https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch5.htm
[http://perma.cc/54G8-RJS9].

7.

Al Bahlul v. United States: D.C. Circuit Reinterprets Military
Commissions Act of 2006 to Allow Retroactive Prosecution of
Conspiracy to Commit War Crimes, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2040 (May 10,
2015) (citing Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir.
2014)).

8.

Osama Bin Laden: Timeline (last visited Jan. 1, 2019)
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/binladen/timeline.
html [https://perma.cc/LT75-X7SU].

9.

HARV. L. REV. supra note 7 (citing Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d
1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).

10.

Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States, 416 U.S. App
.D.C. 340, 792 F.3d 1, 367 (2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing
Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 33-34, 412 U.S. App. D.C. 372
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Henderson, J., concurring)).

11.

Samantha Arrington Sliney, U.S. v. Al Bahlul: Where It’s Been and
Where It’s Going, HARVARD L. SCHOOL NAT’L SEC. J. (March 22, 2016),
available
at
http://harvardnsj.org/2016/03/us-v-al-bahlul/
[http://perma.cc/9MHH-G2W6] (citing United States v. Al Bahlul, 820
F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1162 (2011)); see also Lydia Wheeler, Appeals court
upholds conspiracy conviction for al Qaeda publicist, THE HILL (Oct. 20,
2016),
http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/302004-federalappeals-court-upholds-conspiracy-conviction-for-al-qaeda) (A martyr will
is a “propaganda [declaration] documenting al Qaeda’s role in the
attacks.”).
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the terrorist network’s resident “media man,” Bahlul was too valuable
to lose. 12
In the context of the post-9/11 American political landscape,
Bahlul and Nashiri are decidedly unsympathetic defendants. Both
men were eventually captured; 13 both were charged in military
commission trials with various crimes related to the “war on terror,” 14
and both are currently held at the United States military stronghold
in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 15
Neither is a stranger to the federal appeals system. In different
capacities, both men have made their rounds through the United
States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) and the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit)—the designated appellate
tribunals for trials conducted by military commission—for the greater
part of the last decade. 16 After the Supreme Court denied both of

12.

Sliney, supra note 11 (citing Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 6).

13.

Bahlul was captured in December 2001. In 2002, Bahlul was sent from
Pakistan to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and Nashiri was captured and held
at CIA “black sites” for several years. Harry Graver, Military
Commissions Loom Large at Supreme Court, LAWFARE (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/
military-commissions-loom-largesupreme-court [http://perma.cc/EF6M-U84X].

14.

See, e.g., Matthew Bloom, “I Did Not Come Here To Defend Myself”:
Responding to War on Terror Detainees’ Attempts To Dismiss Counsel
and Boycott the Trial, 117 YALE L. J. 70 (2007) (describing Bahlul and
other Guantánamo defendants as “war on terror detainees” who were
tried pursuant to George W. Bush’s 2001 military order sanctioning
terrorist prosecutions in military commissions). See also Carol
Rosenberg, Conviction of Guantánamo’s Lone Lifer Won’t Be Reviewed
HERALD
(Oct.
10,
2017),
by
Supreme
Court,
MIAMI
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo
/article178042466.html
[http://perma.cc/8MFX-MW8B] (noting that the merits of Nashiri’s
claims largely pivot on when the United States’ “War on Terror”
began).

15.

Bahlul is currently serving a life sentence at Guanántamo. See
Rosenberg, supra note 14. As of March 2018, Nashiri is still in custody
at Guantánamo. He will remain through the conclusion of his military
commission prosecution, which has been delayed following significant
controversy since October 2017. Charlie Savage, Guantánamo Lawyers
Challenge Government’s Explanation for Hidden Microphone, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
12,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/12/us/politics/guantanamo-hidden-microphone.html
[http://perma.cc /6DKT-XKFC].

16.

See Graver, supra note 13 (outlining the progression of the cases). See
also USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fastfacts/index.html [https://perma.cc/FZ9N-QF9M] (providing a timeline
of events following the USS Cole bombing).
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their writs of certiorari in October 2017, 17 Bahlul will serve out the
rest of his life in detention and 18 Nashiri’s trial and appeals process
will continue indefinitely, 19 consuming an outrageous amount of
federal resources over the coming decade. 20
This Note does not attempt to evaluate the claims Bahlul and
Nashiri raise on their merits. Instead, I propose a practical, legislative
mechanism to ensure that constitutional questions hanging over the
military commissions are resolved in a timely manner.
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the military
commissions system in the United States. Moreover, it describes how
commissions at Guantánamo came to be pursuant to the Military
Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009.
Part II reviews the procedural history of Bahlul v. United States,
describes the charge of “conspiracy” as it is traditionally applied in
U.S. domestic and international law, and discusses the Supreme
Court’s denial of certiorari in Bahlul.
Part III discusses Nashiri v. Trump and the Court’s decision to
deny certiorari in that case less than a week after declining to hear
Bahlul.
In Part IV, I analyze the Councilman abstention doctrine and
discuss why the D.C. Circuit should not have abstained in Nashiri.
Part V analyzes the detrimental effects of the Supreme Court’s
refusal to hear Bahlul and Nashiri.
17.

Bahlul v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 313 (Mem) (2017); Al-Nashiri v.
Trump, 138 S.Ct. 354 (Mem) (2017).

18.

Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Turns Down Guantanamo Detainee’s
POST
(Oct.
10,
2017),
Appeal,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_ law/supreme-courtturns-down-guantanamo-detainees-appeal/2017/10/10/
fdc3fe06-ade811e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html?utm_term=.ceada5968a24
[http://perma.cc/NKL3-W8YF].

19.

See Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:08
AM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810730215899137
[https://perma.cc/2PA8-7NNB] (“Even optimistically, Al-Nashiri’s postconviction appeal would not return to the D.C. Circuit before 2024.”);
see also Brief of the National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri v. Donald
J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. at 3 (May 31, 2017)
(No.
16-8966),
available
at
https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/Nashiri-NIMJ-Amicus.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2TW-BWEG] (noting that al-Nashiri’s case would
not be resolved until after his appeal returns to the courts in 2024).

20.

See Guantanamo by the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-numbers
[http://perma.cc/8B2N-MSPJ] (“Yearly cost to hold each detainee at
Guantánamo: More than $10 million. Annual cost to operate
Guantánamo: Approximately $445 million.”).
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Finally, in Part VI, I propose that Congress should carve out an
exception to the Councilman abstention doctrine by adding a
provision to the 2009 MCA that would require federal courts to
exercise collateral review over jurisdictional challenges to the military
commissions.

Part I: Military Commissions in the United States
In the United States, military commissions are military tribunals
convened to prosecute individuals for “unlawful conduct associated
with war.” 21 On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued
a military order authorizing the establishment of a military
commission to try those individuals responsible for the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. 22 Unlike traditional Article III courts, current military
commissions at Guantánamo Bay are a variety of specialized Article I
trial courts sanctioned pursuant to the Military Commissions Act
(MCA) of 2009 23 (and, previously, the MCA of 2006). 24 The tribunals
may try “alien unprivileged enemy belligerent[s]” that have engaged
in—or “purposefully and materially supported”—hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners. 25 The commissions may
also try such enemy combatants that were members of al Qaeda
before their capture. 26 The MCA expressly enumerates 32 offenses
that may be tried by a military commission, as long as they were
“committed in the context of and associated with hostilities.” 27
21.

Military Commissions History, Snapshot: Military Commissions in the
OF
MIL.
COMMISSIONS,
United
States,
OFF.
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/MilitaryCommissionsHistory.aspx
[http://perma.cc/DYU8-GELD] (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).

22.

Id.; Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002), reprinted as
amended in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2012), available at http://www.mc.mil/
Portals/0/MilitaryOrderNov2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYU6-CJD5].

23.

Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123
Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009).

24.

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120
Stat. 2600, 2623–24 (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b)).

25.

How Military Commissions Work, OFF. OF MIL. COMMISSIONS
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS.aspx. [https://perma.cc/W3F4-7WMJ]
(last visited Dec. 27, 2017).

26.

Id.

27.

Graver, supra note 13 (citing Military Commissions Act). See also
Recent Case, In re Al-Nashiri: D.C. Circuit Abstains from Adjudicating
Habeas Petition of Guantanamo Detainee Tried by Military
Commission, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (Febr. 10, 2017), available at
https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/02/in-re-al-nashiri-2/
[https://perma.cc/H7JP-KMY5] (citing 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (2012)
(“‘Hostilities’” are ‘any conflict subject to the laws of war.’” (citing 10
U.S.C. § 948a(9))).
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In the military order, President Bush argued that it would be
impractical to extend the legal and evidentiary principles traditionally
applied in federal criminal trials to military commissions. 28 Despite
the Bush Administration’s loud support for its policy of denying
accused terrorists access to federal courts 29—and although enemy
combatants may be tried by military commission for international war
crimes 30—an enemy combatant is not precluded from prosecution in
an Article III court. 31 President Barack Obama had more faith than
his predecessor in the competence of Article III courts to try accused
terrorists, stating that “in contrast to the commission process, our
Article III federal courts have proven to have an outstanding record of

28.

Military Commissions History, supra note 21 (quoting Military Order of
Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002), reprinted as amended in 10 U.S.C. §
available
at
801
(2012),
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/MilitaryOrderNov2001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AYU6-CJD5]).

29.

Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration’s
Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433,
434-35 (2002).

30.

Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long Reach of Guantánamo Bay Military
(Oct.
4,
2017),
Commissions,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/
opinion/the-long-reach-ofguantanamo-bay-military-commissions.html
[https://perma.cc/9L394XWT] (“[T]he Supreme Court concluded during World War II that
[international war crimes] committed by enemy belligerents fell outside
of the Constitution’s jury-trial protections — which otherwise require
that all serious crimes be tried in civilian court.”) (referring to Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)) (“Congress has explicitly provided, so far
as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in
appropriate cases.”). “[The U.S. Constitution] cannot be taken to have
extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission, or
to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by jury
at common law be tried only in the civil courts.” Id. at 40.

31.

In fact, far more terrorists have been successfully convicted in U.S.
federal civilian courts than in military commissions. Between September
11, 2001 and December 31, 2016, Article III courts prosecuted and
convicted at least 549 people for terror-related charges, while military
commissions have secured only 8 convictions—three of which have since
been overturned or dismissed. David Kris, Law Enforcement as a
Counterintelligence Tool, LAWFARE (Mar. 6, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-enforcement-counterintelligence-tool
[http://perma.cc/43KE-8NUZ] (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY and U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXECUTIVE ORDER 13780:
PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE
UNITED STATES INITIAL SECTION 11 REPORT, 2 (2018), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/
press-release/file/1026436/download
[https://perma.cc/L5MA-PMPV]).
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convicting some of the most hardened terrorists.” 32 The commissions
have been the subject of widespread criticism, and are largely
considered to be a “failed experiment” 33 and an “almost-unmitigated
catastrophe.” 34 Still, more than sixteen years after President Bush
first established them, military commissions at Guantánamo remain
operational—and the doors do not appear to be closing anytime
soon. 35

Part II: Bahlul v. United States
Broadly, Bahlul is illustrative of a judicial system built to shunt
detainee structural challenges to its authority. More narrowly, Bahlul
matters to our inquiry because the case challenged the commissions’
constitutional authority to charge non-law-of-war offenses. Because
the government has become disturbingly comfortable bringing such
32.

President Barrack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on Plan to
Close the Prison at Guantanamo Bay, The White House Office of the
Press
Secretary
(Feb.
23,
2016,
10:30
AM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/23/remarkspresident-plan-close-prison-guantanamo-bay [https://perma.cc/MDD353N7]).

33.

Amy Davidson Sorkin, At Guantánamo, Are Even the Judges Giving
NEW
YORKER
(Feb.
20,
2018),
Up?,
THE
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/at-guantanamo-areeven-the-judges-giving-up [https://perma.cc /7HMD-DJTV] (quoting
Rick Kammen, former “learned counsel” of Nashiri’s defense team).

34.

Kris, supra note 31.

35.

In his first State of the Union address, President Donald Trump
announced his commitment to keeping the Guantánamo military
detention facility open indefinitely. He subsequently signed an Executive
Order codifying that commitment. Julian Borger, Donald Trump Signs
Executive Order to Keep Guantánamo Bay Open, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.
30,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/jan/30/guantanamo-bay-trump-signs-executive-order-tokeep-prison-open
[https://perma.cc/DKD4-N9WC].
Military
commissions at Guantánamo show no signs of slowing themselves.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and other defendants charged with crimes
connected to the 9/11 terrorist attacks are slated to be tried in 2019 at
the earliest. Carol Rosenberg, 9/11 Prosecutors Propose 2019 Trial
Date, But Judge Says Not So Fast, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 24, 2017, 8:38
AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news
/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article169047262.html
[https://perma.cc/272B-V5X7]. In February 2018, the Pentagon fired
the commissions’ convening authority Henry Rishikof, who was
reportedly engaged in negotiations for plea deals—which would have
eliminated the prospect of a protracted trial—with the 9/11 defendants.
Charlie Savage, Before Firing, Tribunal Official Was Exploring Plea
Deal to End 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/us/politics/guantanamo-sept-11rishikof.html [https://perma.cc/GM32-63BD].
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charges against military commission defendants, the claims Bahlul
raised will almost certainly be recycled by future defendants—and will
almost certainly be delayed by the abstention precedent established in
Nashiri.
A.

Bahlul Procedural History

In 2001, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was found and
captured in Pakistan. 36 In 2002, United States forces brought Bahlul
to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 37 The Bahlul case slowly snaked its way
up and down the military tribunal and federal appeals court processes
for more than thirteen years in the period from 2004—when Bahlul
was first charged by military commission at Guantánamo 38—to 2017,
when the Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari and concluded
his case at long last. 39
Initially, in February 2008, Bahlul was charged for three offenses
under the 2006 MCA: conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing
material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit
war crimes. 40 The prosecution alleged that through his work for al
Qaeda, Bahlul had conspired and solicited others to commit seven
object crimes enumerated in the 2006 MCA: murder of protected
persons, murder in violation of the law of war, attacking civilians,
attacking civilian objects, terrorism, providing material support for
terrorism, and destruction of property in violation of the law of war. 41
Bahlul boycotted his commission’s proceedings and ordered his
counsel not to participate—not even to present a defense. 42 The
commission convicted him on all three counts in November of that
year, 43 finding that he had conspired to commit and solicited all seven
alleged object offenses, and actually committed ten additional
prohibited overt acts. 44 Bahlul was sentenced to serve the rest of his

36.

Graver, supra note 13.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Bahlul v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 313 (Mem) (2017). See also Ram
Eachambadi, Supreme Court denies review in conviction of Bin Laden’s
(Oct.
10,
2017),
personal
assistant,
JURIST
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase
/2017/10/supreme-court-deniesreview-in-conviction-of-bin-ladens-personal-assistant.php
[https://perma.cc/67LP-SSLU].

40.

Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.
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life in prison. 45 While the case may seem uncomplicated on its face,46
it raised a serious legal question for both his military commission and
subsequent federal appellate court panels to grapple with: whether
there are constitutional requirements, arising out of Article III,
imposed on military commissions. 47
Bahlul pushed this question as far as the federal appeals process
would allow. After losing at trial, he appealed his three-charge
conviction to the Court of Military Commission Review in January
2010. 48 That chamber affirmed his conviction on all counts in
September 2011. 49 From there, Bahlul took his case to federal court in
accordance with the 2006 MCA. 50
In 2012, Bahlul appealed the CMCR decision to the D.C. Circuit51
in a case that would come to be known as Al Bahlul I. 52 Among other
claims, Bahlul asserted that his conviction violated a number of
constitutional guarantees. 53 First, he argued that his conviction
violated the Constitution’s Articles I and III because the government
had charged him with offenses that could only be heard by an Article
III court. 54 Second, Bahlul asserted that the Ex Post Facto clause
protected him from being charged under the 2006 MCA because that
statute came into force after his capture. 55 Finally, he contended that
his conviction violated the equal protection guarantees of the Due
Process Clause because the commissions are themselves “a segregated
form of justice in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” 56
While Bahlul I was pending in the D.C. Circuit, a panel of that
same court issued an opinion in Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan
II). 57 In that case, the court found that the 2006 MCA did not allow
45.

Id.

46.

Sliney, supra note 11.

47.

Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article III, 49
U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 305, 362 (2015).

48.

Graver, supra note 13.

49.

Id.

50.

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600,
2622 (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(g) (“[T]he [D.C. Circuit] shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a final judgment
rendered by a military commission.”).

51.

Graver, supra note 13.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.
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the commissions to prosecute offenses committed before the statute
was enacted unless the offenses charged already constituted war
crimes triable by military commission under existing domestic law. 58
The government subsequently appealed Bahlul I to the full D.C.
Circuit, conceding that the court would have to vacate Bahlul’s
convictions if the Hamdan II holding stayed in force. 59
In July 2014, the government got its wish. A full panel of the
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled the previous three-judge
panel’s Hamdan II decision in a case known as Bahlul II. 60 The en
banc panel then turned its attention to the merits of Bahlul’s case.
The court applied a plain error standard of review 61 because Bahlul
had forfeited a number of claims by refusing to raise them while
boycotting his trial. 62 On plain error review, the panel did away with
two of Bahlul’s three convictions. 63 First, the court found that
providing material support for terrorism was not a violation of the
laws of war triable by military commission at the time Bahlul
committed that act. 64 Second, the panel determined that soliciting
others to commit war crimes was simply not an offense triable by
military commission at all. 65
After the panel overturned his solicitation and material support
convictions, the only thing keeping Bahlul on the hook was his
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Typically, a party who fails to preserve an argument before a lower
tribunal is barred from raising it on appeal “absent plain error or
exceptional circumstances.” Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 9
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S.
157, 159 (1936)) (also citing Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia,
602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). “A plain error is “[1] an ‘error’ [2]
that is ‘plain’ and [3] that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” Id. at 9-10
(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting Fed.
R. Crim P. 52(b)). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court
may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if [4]
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. at 9 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 467 (1997)). The 2009 MCA further restricts the exercise of
plain error review of military commissions, stating that the court of
appeals may only correct an error that “materially prejudices the
substantial rights of the accused.” 10 U.S.C § 950a.

62.

Graver, supra note 13.

63.

Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW PODCAST (Sept. 12, 2017)
(downloaded using iTunes); Graver, supra note 13.

64.

Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 29.

65.

Id. at 30-31.
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conviction for conspiracy to commit war crimes. The problem?
Inchoate conspiracy to violate the law of war is not, by itself, a
traditional violation of the law of war triable by military
commission. 66 As such, the conspiracy charge presented the stickiest
legal question before the court: Can military commissions prosecute
domestic, non-international war crimes—such as inchoate
conspiracy—without violating the Constitution? 67 The answer to that
question depended—and continues to depend—not on a reading of the
MCA or any other statute, but on the federal courts’ basic
constitutional authority to try domestic offenses that are not also
violations of the laws of war. 68
The D.C. Circuit en banc panel remanded the question of whether
the government may charge conspiracy—without violating either
Article I or Article III of the Constitution—to a traditional threejudge panel of that court. 69 In June 2015—in Bahlul III 70—those three
judges took the question under de novo review because the claim
constituted a “structural” challenge to the commissions “that [could]
not be forfeited.” 71 Bahlul argued that as a criminal defendant, he had
an Article III right to be prosecuted before a civilian jury in federal
court. 72 Certainly, inchoate conspiracy to commit a war crime charges
can be brought in an Article III trial court. 73 In fact, as Chief Judge
Merrick Garland pointed out at oral argument, such charges are
brought every day. 74 What then, he asked, is the justification “for
using a military commission rather than an Article III court?” 75

66.

Martin S. Lederman, Of Spies, Saboteurs, and Enemy Accomplices:
History’s Lessons for the Constitutionality of Wartime Military
Tribunals, 105 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1536 (2017).

67.

Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.

68.

Id.

69.

Graver, supra note 13.

70.

Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

71.

Id. at 3.

72.

Helen Klein Murillo and Alex Loomis, A Summary of the Al Bahlul
(Oct.
21,
2016),
Decision,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-al-bahlul-decision
[https://perma.cc/5GM2-76QX].

73.

Marty Lederman, Reflections from the En Banc Al Bahlul Oral
SECURITY
(Dec.
1,
2015),
Argument,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/28037/reflections-en-banc-al-bahlul-oralargument/ [https://perma.cc/EDZ6-YHGY].

74.

Id.

75.

Id.
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The panel divided, but ultimately vacated Bahlul’s conspiracy
charge on the basis that it did, in fact, violate Article III of the
Constitution. 76 The judges determined that the scope of offenses
triable by military commission “does not extend to the trial of
domestic crimes in general, or inchoate conspiracy in particular,”77
and overturned Bahlul’s conviction on the grounds that “Congress
cannot encroach upon the Article III judicial power by authorizing
military commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants for
conspiracy.” 78 Moving forward, commissions would be limited to
trying international law of war violations, 79 and conspiracy only falls
within that category when committed in the context of genocide. 80
The government petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en
banc of the issues presented in Bahlul III. 81 The court agreed, and the
full court heard Bahlul’s case one final time (this time, as Bahlul
IV). 82 In October 2016, the en banc panel vacated the three-judge
panel’s 2015 holding that Bahlul’s conspiracy charge violated Article
III of the Constitution. 83 In doing so, they upheld Bahlul’s conviction
for inchoate conspiracy and corresponding life sentence. 84 The judges
published a number of opinions, and no particular opinion received
the backing of a majority of the court. 85 The court divided with
regard to what constituted the proper standard of review, 86 and also
as to whether Congress has Article I power to make conspiracy triable

76.

Graver, supra note 13. See also Michael Doyle, Federal Appeals Court
Sets Aside Conviction of Bin Laden Assistant, MIAMI HERALD,
http://www.
miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article
23853043.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/Z2HJ-XSKS] (last
updated June 12, 2015 at 9:06 PM).

77.

Doyle, supra note 76.

78.

Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72; Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d
1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

79.

Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72.

80.

Id.

81.

Wells Bennett, The United States Seeks En Banc Rehearing in Al(July
27,
2015,
2:25
PM),
Bahlul,
LAWFARE
https://lawfareblog.com/united-states-seeks-en-banc-rehearing-al-bahlul
[https://perma.cc/PH8X-H2K8].

82.

Graver, supra note 13.

83.

Id.

84.

See id.

85.

Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63; see also Graver, supra note 13.

86.

Graver, supra note 13.
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by military commission. 87 Of the six-judge majority, only four judges
agreed that it does. 88 A fifth judge affirmed the conviction on the
basis of plain error review but declined to reach the constitutional
question. 89 The sixth and final judge to join the majority concluded
that, in practice, Bahlul was convicted of substantive war crimes in
connection with the 9/11 attacks; conspiracy was only the theory of
liability of the crime. 90 Therefore, he concluded, the constitutional
question was not invoked. Three judges dissented; two others
recused. 91 Bahlul’s only remaining recourse was a writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court, which was denied in October 2017. 92 His
conviction had survived his weighty challenges, and his life sentence
was ultimately upheld.
B.

International vs. Domestic Offenses: What is Conspiracy?

Fairly quickly into Bahlul’s post-conviction appeals process,
conspiracy became the charge of interest for courts and legal
spectators alike. 93 Two different scenarios can give rise to a conspiracy
charge, and the circumstances differ greatly under domestic versus
international law. 94 First, under United States domestic law, if an
individual agrees—with others—to commit a crime, and then takes
even a small step toward the completion of that agreement or crime,
then that individual can be charged with conspiracy. 95 This was the
charge levied against Bahlul.
Charging a person with conspiracy under international law is
more complicated. 96 International law only permits conspiracy charges
against people who engage in plots that result in completed and

87.

Id.

88.

Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72.

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Bahlul v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 313 (Mem) (2017).

93.

See, e.g., Wells C. Bennett, Oral Argument in Al Bahlul: Judge Tatel
and Quirin Dicta, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2014, 7:24 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/oral-argument-al-bahlul-judge-tatel-and-quirindicta [https://perma.cc/EV8F-LSUP] (discussing Judge Tatel’s
discussion of the holding in Ex Parte Quirin and what it means for
“whether the jurisdiction of a Guantanamo military commission
constitutionally may include only international offenses, or both
international as well as domestic ones”).

94.

Margulies, supra note 47, at 368.

95.

Id. at 368-69.

96.

Id.
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unlawful acts of violence—such as murder. 97 An international tribunal
will not consider a plot (or even an agreement) as a war crime in the
absence of a completed act. 98 Further, international criminal tribunals
will not charge a person with conspiracy for only plotting to kill
civilians unless the defendant’s plan facilitates or otherwise aids
another person committing that murder. 99 Thus, under international
law, “conspiracy is not a crime in and of itself.” 100 Instead, it is simply
the theory of responsibility that supports a murder charge. 101 This
theory is grounded in the idea that a person who plans a murder is
just as guilty of the killing as the person who actually commits the
crime. 102
C.

Upholding Bahlul’s Conviction on the Merits

As noted above, the appellate court’s decision to uphold Bahlul’s
conspiracy conviction was not a clean one. 103 In response to his final
appeal to that court in Bahlul IV, the D.C. Circuit—sitting en banc—
splintered in its October 2016 decision regarding his Article III
claim. 104 Although a six-judge majority of the court upheld Bahlul’s
conviction for standalone conspiracy, those in the majority varied in
their reasoning. 105 Despite the court’s inability to sign onto a majority
decision, little doubt remained about the importance of answering the
most important question at bar: whether it is constitutional for
military commissions at Guantánamo to try defendants for domestic
defenses like inchoate conspiracy. 106
In the first footnote of the principle concurring opinion, then
Judge Brett Kavanaugh emphasized the need for a final judgement on
the merits of Bahlul’s claim. “The question of whether conspiracy
may constitutionally be tried by military commission,” he wrote, “is

97.

Id. at 368.

98.

Id. at 369.

99.

Id.

100. Id. at 368.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See generally Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at
the Supreme Court?, supra note 63.
104. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
105. Id.
106. Steve Vladeck, Why the Supreme Court Should Take the Two New
Guantánamo Military Commission Appeals, JUST SECURITY (May 31,
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/41548/supreme-court-guantanamomilitary-commission-appeals/ [https://perma.cc/HBR7-5BJF].
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extraordinarily important and deserves a ‘definitive answer.’” 107 Not
only does it “[implicate] an important part of the U.S. Government’s
war strategy,” it implicates other cases that challenge convictions for
standalone domestic offenses by military commission. 108 Bahlul’s case,
Kavanaugh penned, “unfortunately has been pending in this Court for
more than five years. It is long past time for us to resolve the issue
squarely and definitively.” 109 Prominent scholars, including the
University of Texas at Austin School of Law professor and national
security law scholar Stephen Vladeck, agreed. “At some point,
wouldn’t resolution of the Article III question actually be useful for
the military commissions (and not just for we who write about
them)?” If not, Vladeck asks, “is this all just an elaborate game to
play out the string — and, as such, a waste of a whole lot of time,
energy, and judicial resources?” 110
Writing the principal concurrence for the full D.C. Circuit, then
Judge Kavanaugh espoused a number of justifications for upholding
Bahlul’s conviction on the merits. 111 He noted that Congress’s war
powers give it vast authority to establish military commissions112
without “impos[ing] international law as a constraint on Congress’s
authority to make offenses triable by [those commissions].” 113 Doing
so, he rejected Bahlul’s argument that “Congress and the President
[are] subject to the dictates of the international community” as a
matter of U.S. constitutional law. 114
Next, Kavanaugh pointed to the holding of Ex parte Quirin, in
which the Supreme Court upheld military commission convictions for
espionage. 115 In Quirin, the Court did not expressly limit commissions
to trying international law offenses. 116 Kavanaugh drew a connection
between Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction and the Quirin espionage
convictions on the basis that—similar to inchoate conspiracy—
107. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 760 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Al
Bahlul v. United States, 767 F. 3d 1, 62, 412 U.S. App. D.C. 372 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (separate opinion of Brown, J.)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Stephen Vladeck, Counting to Six in Al Bahlul IX, JUST SECURITY (Dec.
1, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/28042/counting-al-bahlul-iv/
[https://perma.cc/YPD4-FAAT].
111. Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72.
112. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 761.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 763.
115. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
116. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757,
770 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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espionage is not “an offense under the international law of war.”117
Further, he claimed that Quirin itself was a valid military commission
prosecution for conspiracy, asserting that “[t]he two most important
military commission precedents in U.S. history—the trials of the
Lincoln conspirators and the Nazi saboteurs [Quirin]—were
[themselves] trials for the offense of conspiracy.” 118
Finally, Kavanaugh made two historical arguments to support the
plurality’s position. He wrote that historically, international law did
not constrain Congress’s ability to make certain offenses triable by
military commission, pointing out that U.S. military tribunals have
prosecuted non-international law crimes (such as espionage and aiding
the enemy) since 1776. 119 Finally, Kavanaugh argued that Bahlul’s
conviction does not violate Article III because jury trials were not
guaranteed in military commissions as a matter of historical
practice. 120
D.

The End of the Road: The Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in
Bahlul

In 2017, after the full en banc D.C. Circuit reinstated Bahlul’s
conspiracy conviction, he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court of the United States. 121 In his petition, Bahlul
articulated three claims. 122 First, Bahlul asked, “May Congress vest
these military commissions with federal courts’ jurisdiction over
wholly domestic crimes?” 123
Second, Bahlul raised two ex post facto claims. 124 The first was
statutory; the second, constitutional. The statutory question he
presented was: “Does the text of the 2006 MCA overcome the
presumption against retroactivity to authorize prosecutions for
conduct committed before its enactment?” 125 The constitutional
question regarding the ex post facto claims was more important.126

117. Id. at 763.
118. Id. at 766.
119. Id. at 765.
120. Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72.
121. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v.
U.S., 840 F.3d 757 (2016) (No. 16-1307).
122. Id. at ii.
123. Id. at 14.
124. Graver, supra note 13.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Bahlul asked: “Assuming the 2006 MCA authorizes such prosecutions,
is this kind of arrangement constitutional?” 127
Third, Bahlul wrapped up his certiorari petition with an equal
protection claim. 128 He asserted that by limiting the commissions’
jurisdiction to non-citizens, Congress had effectively created a
“segregated justice system in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” 129
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to answer the call to
resolve the statutory and constitutional questions Bahlul presented
it. 130 This denial of certiorari—when combined with the D.C. Circuit’s
fractured rejection of Bahlul’s constitutional challenges in Bahlul IV—
leaves the Article III puzzle largely unsolved. 131 Technically, due to
the D.C. Circuit’s inability to reach an authoritative conclusion, the
2011 Court of Military Commission Review merits decision remains
controlling on the issues, 132 notwithstanding the fact that none of the
D.C. Circuit opinions issued affirmed on the basis of the CMCR’s
reasoning. 133
On October 16, 2017—six days after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari to Bahlul 134—it denied certiorari to Nashiri, too. 135 The
Court’s denial in each case is individually unfortunate. In confluence,
however, both denials together brewed a perfect storm that will have
detrimental effects on the military commissions system for years—if
not decades—to come.

Part III: Nashiri v. Trump
Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri is a Saudi Arabian citizen who has been
charged with planning the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole off the coast of
Yemen in October 2000 136—approximately eleven months before the
9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. He is also
suspected of planning the attack on the French supertanker M/V
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10043, SUPREME
COURT DECLINES TO TAKE UP MILITARY COMMISSION CHALLENGES – AL
BAHLUL AND AL-NASHIRI 1 (2017).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Bahlul v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 313 (Mem) (2017).
135. Al-Nashiri v. Trump, 138 S.Ct. 354 (Mem) (2017).
136. Recent Case, supra note 27, at 1250 (citing In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d
110, 113-14 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
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Limburg in 2002. 137 Nashiri was captured in 2002, 138 and a military
commission was convened at Guantánamo Bay in 2011 to try him for
his role in the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. 139
It is important to note that although his commission has been
constituted, Nashiri has not yet been tried. 140 As such, his attempts to
challenge his tribunal’s jurisdiction over him were executed
exclusively through pretrial motions. 141 Both the substance and the
pretrial nature of Nashiri’s claims will ultimately impact our analysis
here. More importantly, they underline the significance of the
Supreme Court’s denial of his claims.
Nashiri’s coordinated bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and other
vessels more closely resembles an international war crime triable by
military commission than Bahlul’s work as bin Laden’s media man.142
Although the commissions charged both men with conspiracy, the
case against Nashiri is stronger than it was against Bahlul for two
reasons.
First, Nashiri’s conspiracy charge is connected to the commission
of overt acts—including his attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and French
supertanker M/V Limburg. Therefore, it qualifies as an international
law of war offense under the MCA and is triable by military
commission. 143 Bahlul, on the other hand, was charged with inchoate
conspiracy not connected to a completed act. 144 Traditionally,
inchoate conspiracy was not considered an international law of war
offense triable by military commission (D.C. Circuit 2015 en banc
decision notwithstanding). 145

137. Graver, supra note 13.
138. Id.
139. Recent Case, supra note 27, at 1250 (citing In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d
at 113-4); see also Graver, supra note 13 (describing the prosecution
proceedings of Nashiri).
140. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.
141. Id.
142. Vladeck, Why the Supreme Court Should Take the Two New
Guantánamo Military Commission Appeals, supra note 106.
143. Robert Chesney, Military Commission Charges Referred Against Al(Sept.
28,
2011,
2:19
PM),
Nashiri,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/military-commission-charges-referredagainst-al-nashiri [https://perma.cc/22WD-VU9E]; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29)
(2006).
144. See generally Lederman, supra note 66 (discussing convictions and
justifications of inchoate conspiracies within the law of war).
145. Id. at 1536-1540.

378

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Time’s Up, Councilman

Second, Nashiri is also charged with additional law-of-war offenses
enumerated in the MCA. 146 His additional charges include using
treachery or perfidy, 147 murder in violation of the law of war,148
terrorism, 149 intentionally causing serious bodily injury, 150 attacking
civilians, 151 attacking civilian objects, 152 and hazarding a vessel.153
Because Nashiri’s tribunal has clear jurisdiction over these additional
offenses, the constitutionality of a commission prosecuting him for
conspiracy will not make or break his case the way it did for Bahlul.
Perhaps because his conviction does not hang on the validity of a
conspiracy charge, Nashiri raises a different subject-matter
jurisdictional challenge than Bahlul did. The substantive question in
Nashiri is whether the MCA empowers—and the Constitution
allows—military commissions to try war crimes not committed within
the context of armed conflict with the United States. 154 Stated
otherwise, “at the time that [Nashiri] was involved in the bombing of
the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000,” was the United States “at war with
al Qaeda such that the laws of war applied and a military commission
was authorized?” 155
After his arrest, Nashiri filed a motion with his commission,
arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to try him under this
framework. 156 The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, he submitted, was not
committed “in the context of and associated with hostilities”157
between the United States and al Qaeda 158 because it occurred before
146. Chesney, supra note 143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t.
147. Chesney, supra note 143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(17).
148. Chesney, supra note 143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(15).
149. Chesney, supra note 143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24).
150. Chesney, supra note 143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(13).
151. This charge arises from Nashiri’s attack on French tanker the Limburg.
Chesney, supra note 143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(2).
152. This charge also arises from the Limburg attack. Chesney, supra note
143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(3).
153. This charge arises from the Limburg attack as well. Chesney, supra note
143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(23).
154. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.
155. Id.
156. Graver, supra note 13.
157. Recent Case, supra note 27, at 1249-50; see also 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9)
(defining “hostilities” as “any conflict subject to the laws of war.”).
158. Graver, supra note 13 (“[Nashiri’s counsel] peg the start of hostilities to
operations in Yemen in September 2003, arguing that was the first time
and place the president ‘extend[ed] the AUMF’s war-making authorities’
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the 9/11 attacks in New York. Since the United States was not
engaged with al Qaeda before 9/11, Nashiri contends his tribunal
lacks jurisdiction to charge him under the MCA for acts committed in
that timeframe. 159
Nashiri then went above his commission to contest its jurisdiction
to try him based on these arguments. He filed a writ of habeas corpus
with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia160
and a petition for a writ of mandamus with the D.C. Circuit. 161 The
mandamus petition challenged the way judges are assigned to the
Court of Military Commission Review, which will be the first court to
hear Nashiri’s appeal if his military commission convicts him. 162 The
panel denied mandamus relief, 163 largely on the basis that Nashiri
retains the right to challenge the CMCR’s panel composition on postas recognized in a War Powers Resolution report. If this date is correct,
Nashiri would have been in custody for roughly a year before ‘hostilities’
started and the commission would lack jurisdiction over him under the
MCA.”).
159. Graver, supra note 13; see also Recent Case, supra note 27 (discussing
the jurisdiction of military commissions under the MCA in the
aftermath of 9/11).
160. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.
161. Id.
162. Stephen Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit’s Thoroughly Convincing Decision
(June
23,
2015,
12:20
PM),
in
al-Nashiri,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/
dc-circuits-thoroughly-convincingdecision-al-nashiri [https://perma.cc/9DCT-K7PY].
163. It is worth noting that the bar for mandamus is unusually high in the
D.C. Circuit. See Stephen Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit’s PassiveAggressive Approach to Military Commission Mandamus, LAWFARE
(July 31, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/dc-circuits-passiveaggressive-approach-military-commission-mandamus
[https://perma.cc/R2TX-UA2R] (“Indeed, one of the questions
presented in the pending cert. petition in al-Nashiri II is whether the
mandamus standard is inappropriately high.”); See also Steven Vladeck
(Feb.
21,
2018,
10:12
AM),
(@steve_vladeck),
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/966375180258938882
[https://perma.cc/PC6S-UBF5] (“[T]he D.C. Circuit has imposed a
ridiculously (and unjustifiably) high bar for the issuance of [mandamus]
relief to the military commissions . . .”). Petitioners must satisfy all
three prongs of the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus test in order to receive the
writ. In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Mandamus is
proper only if three conditions are satisfied: First, the party seeking
issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the
relief he desires... Second, the petitioner must satisfy the burden of
showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.
Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing
court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is
appropriate under the circumstances.”).
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conviction appeal, 164 and because his claim for relief was not “clear
and indisputable.” 165 More importantly, Nashiri’s habeas petition was
rejected 166 on the basis that Councilman abstention 167—an abstention
doctrine unique to military tribunals—militates against federal court
review of Nashiri’s claims until he brings them on post-conviction
appeal. 168
Less than a week after it denied certiorari in Bahlul, the Supreme
Court declined to hear Nashiri’s case. As a result, Nashiri’s
proceedings have continued in anticipation of his eventual trial at
Guantánamo, and he is barred from re-challenging his commission’s
jurisdiction until after he is—presumably—convicted. 169

Part IV: Councilman Abstention
A.

So, What is Councilman Abstention?

Abstention doctrines are Supreme Court doctrines that permit—
or in some cases, require—federal courts to decline to hear a case if
doing so would encroach upon another court’s power to resolve it.170
These doctrines are typically named after the Supreme Court cases in
which they were conceived. 171
The Supreme Court developed the Councilman abstention
doctrine in the 1975 case Councilman v. Schlesinger. 172 In
Councilman, an Army captain was court-martialed for possessing
marijuana. 173 The Court determined that it was proper for the federal
courts system to abstain from hearing the captain’s collateral
challenges until after the court-martial proceedings had run their
164. Vladeck, supra note 162.
165. Id. (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d at 85-86).
166. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.
167. See generally Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (discussing
the jurisdiction of military courts and court-martial proceedings).
168. Id. See also Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the
Supreme Court?, supra note 63. (discussing Nashiri’s claims and
potential appeal).
169. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.
170. See generally JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS
¶
3.02
(2018),
available
at
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink
/7642f39c-983d-4528-b2403b6dc9bd2ae6/?context=1000516 (discussing the various doctrines,
requirements, and defenses of abstention).
171. Id.
172. 420 U.S. 738.
173. Id. at 739.
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course. 174 As a broader doctrine, Councilman stands for the mandate
that civilian courts should not review habeas petitions until a military
proceeding concludes its inquiry. 175 Conceptually, it is based on “two
considerations of comity that together favor abstention,” 176 which the
Court addressed in depth in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
In defining the first comity consideration, the Hamdan Court
noted that military discipline—as it contributes to the smooth
operation of the Armed Services overall—is best served when civilian
courts refrain from interfering in the military justice system. 177
The second consideration stems from the Court’s observation that
the military justice system already includes civilian judges removed
from military control and influence. 178 By designing the system in this
way, the Court thought Congress had struck an appropriate balance
between institutional military interests and those of individual service
members. 179 Federal courts, the Supreme Court concluded, should
respect this balance. 180 The Court was confident that the procedural
safeguards Congress wrote into the military justice system would
protect servicemen’s constitutional rights, 181 and would justify
abstention for the duration of ongoing courts-martial proceedings.
B.

Councilman Abstention Should Not Extend to Military Commissions

The D.C. Circuit determined that the Councilman abstention
doctrine prevented Nashiri from bringing pretrial challenges to his

174. Id. at 759-60.
175. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of
Petitioner at 6, al-Nashiri v. Trump, et al., 138 S.Ct. 354 (2017) (No.
16-8966) (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 759).
176. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 586 (2006); see also Obaydullah v.
Obama, 609 F.3d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the two
considerations as mentioned in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld).
177. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 586 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.
738, 752 (1975)) (“[M]ilitary discipline and, therefore, the efficient
operation of the Armed Forces are best served if the military justice
system acts without regular interference from civilian courts.”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758) (“[F]ederal courts should
respect the balance that Congress struck between military preparedness
and fairness to individual service members when it created ‘an
integrated system of military courts and review procedures, a critical
element of which is the Court of Military Appeals consisting of civilian
judges completely removed from all military influence or persuasion . . .
.’”).
181. Id. (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758).
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commission’s jurisdiction over him. 182 In other words, the court
elected not to exercise its power of review over Nashiri’s claims until
he raises them on post-conviction appeal. This decision was misguided
at best. Broadening Councilman abstention to apply to military
commissions is not just detrimental as a matter of social policy; it is
unjustified in light of the Court’s own basis for establishing and
upholding the doctrine in the first place.
In Nashiri, the D.C. Circuit conceded that Councilman requires
federal courts to have confidence in both “the adequacy of the
alternative system in protecting the rights of defendants” and “the
importance of the interests served by allowing that system to proceed
uninterrupted by federal courts” in order to abstain. 183 That they
found this confidence in the military commissions is remarkable.
Certainly, abstention makes sense in the context of trials by courtsmartial, which invoke both of Councilman’s mandatory
“considerations of comity.” 184 Unlike courts-martial, however,
collateral pre-trial review of the Guantánamo commissions does not
implicate either comity considerations underlying Councilman. 185
i.

The First “Consideration of Comity” Does Not Apply to Military
Commissions

The first “consideration of comity”—that military justice is best
served when federal courts do not get involved—does not apply in
military commission cases because concerns about military discipline
are irrelevant when the defendant is not a member of the Armed
Services. 186 None of the Guantánamo military commission defendants,
including Nashiri and Bahlul, are members of the U.S. Armed
Services. As such, the first comity consideration is plainly not invoked
in their cases.
182. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.
183. In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
184. See Brief of the National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus Curiae
in Support of the Petitioner at 5-15, al-Nashiri v. Trump, et al. (2017)
(No. 16-8966) (quoting Hamdan, 548 at 586) (discussing the Councilman
abstention doctrine) [hereinafter Brief 16-8966]; see also Brief of the
National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Petitioner at 3-8, In re al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(Nos. 15-1023, 15-5020) (quoting Hamdan, 548 at 586) (discussing
Councilman abstention doctrine) [hereinafter Brief 15-1023].
185. Brief 15-1023, supra note 184, at 3-4
186. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 587 (2006) (“[The detainee] is not a
member of our Nation’s Armed Forces, so concerns about military
discipline do not apply.”); see also Obaydullah v. Obama, 609 F.3d 444,
448 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that circumstances are entirely different
between an ongoing court-martial of a military service member and a
potential future military commission trial of an alien detainee).
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ii.

The Second “Consideration of Comity” Does Not Apply to Military
Commissions

The second “consideration of comity”—that federal courts should
respect the balance Congress created between military institutional
interests and service member individual interests—does not apply for
two reasons.
First, unlike the court-martial at issue in Councilman, military
commissions are subservient to, and not separate from, Article III
federal courts. 187 The MCA gives Article III courts direct review over
questions of law arising out of military commissions. 188 Abstention
achieves nothing in this context because both the military
commissions and the Court of Military Commission Review ultimately
answer to the D.C. Circuit anyway. 189 And, unlike other commonlyapplied abstention doctrines—many of which allow State courts to
reach an initial conclusion despite ultimately being subject to
Supreme Court review—abstention in the military commission
context cannot be justified on the basis of federalism.
When the Court decided Councilman v. Schlesinger, federal courts
did not have jurisdiction to review courts-martial decisions. 190 The
court-martial decision at issue was only reviewable by higher military
tribunals; as a civilian court, the Supreme Court lacked the power of
review it maintains over modern commissions. 191 By abstaining from
courts-martial cases, civilian courts of the Councilman era rightfully
declined to intervene in an entirely separate trial and appellate court
structure from the Article III court system. 192
Modern military commissions are not separate from civilian courts
in the way courts-martial were in Councilman’s time. 193 The
commissions are therefore “directly subservient” to civilian federal
courts, 194 and the D.C. Circuit has mandatory, supervisory jurisdiction
over appeals arising out of them. 195 This jurisdiction includes the right
187. Brief 15-1023, supra note 184, at 3-8.
188. Id. at 4-5.
189. Id. at 4-5 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 950g (2006)).
190. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746 (1975) (“Congress [has
not] conferred on any Art. III court jurisdiction directly to review courtmartial determinations. The valid, final judgments of military courts,
like those of any court of competent jurisdiction not subject to direct
review for errors of fact or law, have res judicata effect and preclude
further litigation of the merits.”).
191. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 10.
192. Id. at 11.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 10.
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to review any and all questions of law that emerge on appeal from the
Court of Military Commission Review. 196 As such, unlike the courtmartial at issue in Councilman v. Schlesinger, the D.C. Circuit’s
determinations in military commission cases are expressly binding
upon the commissions themselves. 197
Second, one could dispute how well Congress actually struck a
balance between fairness and military preparedness when it enacted
the MCA. 198 This is largely due to lingering questions about whether
Guantánamo defendants receive Bill of Rights protections, the D.C.
Circuit’s inability to reach a consensus on the legal questions in
Bahlul, 199 and the commissions’ reluctance to self-correct in
accordance with Supreme Court expectations of the military justice
system. 200
iii.

Additional Reasons Councilman Should Not Apply to Military
Commissions

Perhaps because the first comity consideration is so blatantly
inapplicable to military commission trials of non-service members, the
D.C. Circuit relied heavily on the 2009 MCA—and how it changed
the Court’s analysis of the second comity consideration—to justify
abstaining in Nashiri. 201 Even if the D.C. Circuit is correct that the
post-Hamdan 2009 MCA sufficiently tips the scales in favor of
abstention, other countervailing factors still render the application of
Councilman to military commissions seriously improper. 202
The D.C. Circuit decided to abstain in Nashiri after concluding
that the MCA implicitly instructs Article III courts not to review a
military commission case until the military system has itself wrapped
up its inquiry. 203 While this inference may have held water when
Congress enacted the original 2006 MCA, the statutory language
giving rise to this conclusion is no longer in force today. In passing

196. Id.
197. Id. at 12.
198. Brief 15-1023, supra note 184, at 5.
199. Id. (citing Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 27–31 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (en banc)).
200. Id. (citing United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009)).
201. See In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Heeding the
political branches’ instruction as to the timing of Article III review
qualifies as an ‘important countervailing interest’ warranting abstention,
at least where that instruction is based on those branches’ assessment of
national security needs.”).
202. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 10.
203. Id. at 12 (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 124 (emphasis added)).
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the 2009 MCA, Congress removed the provision of the original act204
that expressly denied Article III courts collateral review of claims
challenging military commissions. 205 Basic canons of statutory
interpretation instruct courts to interpret laws and their provisions
consistent with any subsequent amendments, 206 and when two
statutes (or two versions of one statute) conflict, the more recentlyenacted statute controls. 207 As such, federal courts should consider the
2009 MCA—which does not expressly ban collateral review by civilian
courts—much more probative of Congressional intent on this issue
than the 2006 MCA, which could have been read as encouraging
abstention until that provision was repealed three years later. 208
Further, longstanding Supreme Court doctrine dictates that
requiring defendants to exhaust military remedies before challenging
the military’s right to try them in the first place is markedly unfair.209
The Supreme Court has stated that it would be improper to force a
204. 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) (2006) (previously enacted as Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2623–24)
(“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any
other provision of law . . . no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action. . . relating
to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission under
this chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of
military commissions under this chapter.”); see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 950j, 123
Stat. 2190, 2605 (demonstrating the removal of 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b)).
205. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 12.
206. Judge Russell E. Carparelli, The Rehnquist Court’s Canons of Statutory
Construction, NCSL.ORG, n. 38 (2005), available at http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/lsss/2013pds/rehnquist_court_canons_citations.pdf
[https:// perma.cc/JA3U-T8YD] (outline derived from William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994)). (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 14951 (1987)).
207. Often referred to as the “later in time” rule, the Colorado Office of
Legislative Legal Services describes this canon using the following
hypothetical: “If [there is] a conflict between two statutory provisions
and one of the provisions took effect July 1, 2013, and the other took
effect July 1, 2014, the court will apply the one that took effect in
2014.” Colorado General Assembly, Commonly Applied Rules of
Statutory
Construction,
LEG.COLORADO.GOV,
https://leg.colorado.gov/agencies/office-legislative-legalservices/commonly-applied-rules-statutory-construction
[https://perma.cc/P7SV-5USZ] (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
208. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 13.
209. Id. at 3 (quoting Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, n.8 (1969)) (“[It is]
especially unfair to require exhaustion of military remedies when the
complainants raise[] substantial arguments denying the right of the
military to try them at all.”).
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defendant who contests the “very authority of the Government to
hale him into court to face trial on the charge against him” to wait to
bring those claims on post-conviction appeal. 210 In such cases, even a
future acquittal or reversal cannot adequately remedy the injury a
defendant suffers by enduring not just a voidable, but a void trial.211
This injustice is exacerbated for defendants like Nashiri and others
tried in military commissions for capital crimes. 212 If Nashiri is correct
on the merits of his jurisdictional challenge, he could ultimately be
put to death following invalid proceedings. The D.C. Circuit’s
decision to abstain in Nashiri is directly contrary to—and threatens
to undermine—this equity principle, and it is safe to say that the
D.C. Circuit seriously missed the point of the questions Councilman
instructed them to ask. 213

Part V: The Effects of Supreme Court Abdication in
Nashiri and Bahlul
Supreme Court review of military commission cases is unique
because the Court is not pressured to grant certiorari in order to
remedy a circuit split. 214 This is because all military commission
appeals are necessarily processed, heard, and decided by the D.C.
Circuit alone. 215 Military commission appeals, therefore, necessarily
bypass the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States’ first
consideration governing review of certiorari petitions: that the Court
looks to remedy circuit splits among the lower courts. 216 A statutory
system that sends all military commission appeals through one circuit
alone makes it easier for the Court to duck the questions those
appeals raise—even in cases where that single circuit fractures in its
reasoning.
The nature of the D.C. Circuit’s en banc fracture over the Bahlul
constitutional question makes it the most compelling analogy to a
circuit split that military commission cases have manifested thus far.
Still, both Bahlul and Nashiri failed to make it onto the Supreme
Court’s docket, leaving Boumediene v. Bush 217 the most recent
210. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 3. (quoting Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1977)).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 6 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 759 (1975)).
215. Id.
216. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule
10(a).
217. 551 U.S. 1160 (2007).
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military Guantánamo appeal the Court picked up—a hefty ten years
ago. 218 By refusing to entertain the questions raised in these cases, the
Supreme Court has abdicated its historical responsibility to clarify the
law of the land in cases where lower authorities reach divergent
conclusions. It is a technical loophole to avoid addressing substantive
problems that will have lasting consequences on the military justice
system.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Nashiri’s pretrial claims, for
example, has already had deleterious effects on his case. 219 Military
commission trials conducted pursuant to the 2006 and subsequent
2009 MCAs are notoriously inexpedient, 220 and forcing Nashiri to wait
and bring his jurisdictional challenge after his expected conviction
means civilian court review of his case is years away. 221 The most
generous estimates predict the D.C. Circuit will not again hear
Nashiri’s claims—next time brought post-conviction in accordance
with Councilman abstention doctrine222—until 2024. 223 At that time, if
a future D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court composed of new and
different judges and justices determines that Nashiri is correct on the
218. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. top court leaves Guantanamo detainee’s
(Oct.
10,
2017,
9:47
AM),
conviction
intact,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-guantanamo/u-s-topcourt-leaves-guantanamo-detainees-conviction-intact-idUSKBN1CF1T5
[https://perma.cc/7NN2-9QDD].
219. Carol Rosenberg, Now We Know Why Defense Attorneys Quit the USS
Cole Case. They Found a Microphone., MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 07, 2018,
1:05
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo
/article203916094.html
[https://perma.cc/K68G-CG8T].
220. No official trial date has been set for Khalid Sheik Mohammad and the
other four defendants charged with conspiring to commit the 9/11 terror
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. The trial is not
expected to begin until January 2019—more than seventeen years after
they committed their alleged crimes and more than ten years after their
first arraignment in 2008. See José Iglesias, About the 9/11 War Crimes
HERALD
(Jan.
13,
2018
at
8:46
PM),
Trial,
MIAMI
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/
guantanamo/article1928877.html [https://perma.cc/9E6E-CM4M].
221. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810730215899137
[https://perma.cc/ZEY4-ZD96]; see also Brief 16-8966, supra note 184,
at 3.
222. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:07 AM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810525236125696
[https://perma.cc/ZB37-E6E4].
223. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810730215899137
[https://perma.cc/2FJ3-TJG7]; See also Brief 16-8966, supra note 184
at 3 (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 135 (2016)).
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merits of his claims, then all the time, money, manpower, and other
resources expended to see his trial through to verdict will ultimately
have been wasted. 224
Even more important than the effects that denying certiorari will
have on Nashiri individually are those that will percolate through the
entire military justice system. 225 Although Nashiri’s substantive claims
are specific to his own case, the procedural challenge he raised
implicates all military trials. 226 The now-controlling D.C. Circuit
ruling in his case broadens the Councilman abstention doctrine to
apply to all trials by military commission. 227
The denials of certiorari in Bahlul and Nashiri are particularly
devastating in the aggregate. 228 Because the D.C. Circuit’s holding in
Nashiri means Councilman abstention now applies to all military
commission cases going forward, it therefore applies to any future
detainee who recycles Bahlul’s Article III constitutional challenges.
Put simply, the next defendant who wants to contest the
commissions’ jurisdiction over purely domestic offenses will have to
wait to raise the issue on post-conviction appeal.
This is a real problem given the protracted nature of military
commission trials—which often last for years—and the commissions’
apparent comfort with charging non-international law of war offenses.
Since they were established in 2002, the Guantánamo commissions
have relied heavily on domestic charges to convict defendants. 229 Of
the eleven military commission trials conducted since 2006, seven of
those defendants—including Bahlul—have been charged with at least
one purely domestic offense. 230 The government shows no signs of
abating their charging practice in this regard, 231 and someone is bound
224. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:09 AM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810922596163584
[https://perma.cc/L7QM-N96N]. See also Brief 16-8966, supra note 184,
at 4.
225. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:11 AM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918811308941824000
[https://perma.cc/7RFL-RFCF].
226. Id.
227. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:10 AM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918811111675301888
[https://perma.cc/4HKY-BYBZ]; See also Brief 16-8966, supra note
184, at 4 (discussing extending the Councilman doctrine to Guantanamo
commissions).
228. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme
Court?, supra note 63.
229. Vladeck, supra note 30.
230. Id.
231. While delivering his first State of the Union address, President Donald
Trump stated, “I just signed an order directing Secretary Mattis to
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to re-raise the Bahlul Article III question that fractured the D.C.
Circuit. In other words, in light of the government’s charging practice,
a future habeas petition asserting Bahlul’s Article III challenge could
bring down the military commissions as the government currently
conducts them. Unfortunately, because Councilman abstention now
extends to military commissions after Nashiri, this inevitable
challenge will not be re-raised for a long, long time.
When that happens, a future makeup of the D.C. Circuit or the
Supreme Court could decide that Bahlul was correct on the merits,
and that military commissions lack constitutional authority to charge
domestic offenses like inchoate conspiracy. Leaving this outcome to
chance risks vacating a yet-unknown number of terrorist convictions
for non-international law of war offenses. In the meantime, the
American taxpayer will foot an exorbitant bill for resources invested
litigating these questions indefinitely.

Part VI: Proposal for Amendment to the 2009 MCA
Creating an Exception to Councilman Abstention for
Military Commissions
On January 30, 2018, in his first State of the Union address,
President Donald Trump committed to keeping Guantánamo open
indefinitely as a military detention facility for “unlawful enemy
combatants.” 232 Although expected, this announcement dampened
hopes that the military commissions would wind down anytime soon
in light of looming questions about their constitutional authority.233
Because judicial resolution of these questions is currently foreclosed,
Congress should consider enacting a legislative solution to this
problem. I propose that Congress revise the MCA to override the
D.C. Circuit’s extension of Councilman to military commissions.

reexamine our military detention policy and to keep open the detention
facilities at Guantánamo Bay.” Writing for The New York Times,
Nicholas Fandos commented that “[t]his announcement was expected.
Essentially a symbolic act, it brings executive branch policy into line
with reality: The prison remains open for business, at least for those
detainees who are already there.” Trump’s First State of the Union
(Jan.
30,
2018),
Speech,
Annotated,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/30/us/politics/state-ofthe-union-2018-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/MC9T-BGRW].
232. Id.; see also W.J. Hennigan, President Trump’s Keeping Guantánamo
(Jan.
31,
2018),
on
the
Political
Radar,
TIME
http://time.com/5126446/donald-trump-state-union-guantanamo/
[https://perma.cc/XUK2-HF3V] (discussing the implications of
President Trump’s statements on Guantánamo).
233. See generally Al Bahlul v. U.S., 792 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(prefacing the statutory and constitutional issues at play in this case).
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As a general matter, the Supreme Court has indicated that federal
courts should only abstain in narrow, limited, and exceptional
circumstances. 234 In other words, abstention is, itself, the exception to
the general rule, 235 and exceptions to federal abstention doctrines are
not uncommon. 236 Take, for example, the Younger abstention
doctrine. 237 Younger bars federal courts from reviewing civil rights
tort claims until any state court prosecutions arising from those
claims have concluded. 238 Even Younger—one of the broadest
abstention doctrines, and one that is least permissive to federal
courts—still provides exceptions to its mandate, including allowing
federal courts to get involved when the state law in question is
blatantly unconstitutional. 239
Although typically judge-made law, Congress has the authority to
legislate an exception therein. Article I, § 8, Clause 9 of the U.S.
Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court.” 240 Article III, § 1 vests the judicial
power of the United States in the Supreme Court and those “inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.” 241 Most importantly, Article III, § 2, clause 2 makes the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme and lower federal courts subject
to Congressional regulation. 242 Using this authority, Congress has the
power to change the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction and require that court
to review habeas petitions raising jurisdictional challenges to the
military commissions.
As previously discussed, Congress has acted upon this authority
before with regard to the 2006 and 2009 MCAs. The 2006 MCA
contained a provision that expressly banned Article III court collateral
review of military commission cases. 243 At that time, the statute
stated:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and
notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section
234. See COOK & SOBIESKI, JR., supra note 170.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
238. Id. at 41.
239. Id.at 53-4.
240. U.S. CONST. art. 1 §8, cl. 9.
241. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
242. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 2.
243. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120
Stat. 2600, 2623–24 (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b)).
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2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision), no court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any
claim or cause of action. . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or
judgment of a military commission under this chapter, including
challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of military
commissions under this chapter. 244

The revised 2009 MCA eliminated this entire provision from the
statute. 245 As noted, the D.C. Circuit in Nashiri declined to read this
removal as persuasive evidence that Congress intended to allow
civilian collateral review of Guantánamo cases. Congress can now
override Nashiri by adding another provision to the statute that
expressly encourages—or preferably, mandates—Article III collateral
review of Guantánamo detainees’ jurisdictional challenges. This
revision would be compatible with longstanding Supreme Court
doctrine that there is something very wrong with courts waiting so
long to entertain defendants who challenge the very power of their
tribunals to try them in the first place. 246
The D.C. Circuit is commonly referred to as the second-most
important court in the U.S., trailing only the Supreme Court itself.247
One could raise concerns that Congress exempting military
commissions from Councilman doctrine would cause Guantánamo
cases to overburden the D.C. Circuit’s docket. These concerns,
however, would be misplaced.
Despite its unique stature within the federal court system, the
D.C. Circuit consistently boasts the smallest docket for any U.S.
circuit court, even when compared to circuits that seat an identical
number of judges. For example, the Seventh Circuit recorded 1,637
pending cases through the September 30, 2017 reporting period, while
the Eighth Circuit logged 1,875. The D.C. Circuit logged only 1,391

244. Id.
245. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 12.
246. Id. at 3 (quoting Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, n.8 (1969)) (“[It is]
especially unfair to require exhaustion of military remedies when the
complainants raise[] substantial arguments denying the right of the
military to try them at all.”).
247. Glenn Kessler, Is the D.C. Circuit Last In ‘Almost Every Category’?,
POST
(Jun.
6,
2013),
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/is-the-dccircuit-last-in-almost-every-category/2013/06/05/ a589b186-ce22-11e28f6b-67f40e176f03_blog.html?utm_term=.78a0be6f8de0
[https://perma.cc/MJ79-K4AW]; Aaron Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review –
Reviewed: The Second Most Important Court?, Yale L. J. Notice &
Comment Blog (Sept. 4, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuitreview-reviewed-the-second-most-important-court-by-aaron-nielson/
[https://perma.cc/9S6T-7KVC].
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pending cases. 248 Even more illustrative were the 3,000 new appeals
filed with both the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals
during that same reporting period, compared to less than 1,000 in the
D.C. Circuit. 249 All three courts seat eleven judges. 250 If concerns
remain that an exemption would overburden the D.C. Circuit,
Congress could further limit the number of collateral review petitions
filed by narrowing the exception to apply to jurisdictional challenges
only.

Conclusion
This year, the military commission system at Guantánamo
entered its 16th year. Despite tremendous time and resources, the
commissions have prosecuted fewer than a dozen people for domestic
and international law of war offenses. The Supreme Court has not
elected to review a Guantánamo case since 2008, and the Court’s
denial of Bahlul and Nashiri in October 2017 came as a
disappointment to many. Although questions about their
constitutionality hang over the commissions, it is time to elevate the
discussion from why the commissions might be unconstitutional to
how we can better facilitate judicial resolution to these questions. It is
high time for Congress to step up to the plate and legislate an
amendment to the 2009 MCA that forces the D.C. Circuit to revisit
this issue sooner rather than later.

248. UNITED STATES COURTS CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA TABLES, U.S.
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(TABLE B).
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EIGHTH
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https://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/
active-and-senior-judges
[https://perma.cc/XL3J-47WM] (last visited Mar. 2, 2018; UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,
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[https://perma.cc/6ZC5-P3FV] (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
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